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Abstract
The quality of network services deteriorates as network utilization
increases beyond a certain point, i.e., congestion externalities. Many
researchers have proposed congestion pricing models which internalize
congestion externalities. However, most studies are based on a unit
pricing which cannot reflect user’s different congestion sensitivities. The
purpose of this paper is to propose a discriminatory congestion pricing
model using adverse selection. Our pricing mechanism provides a
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congestion-sensitive user with a high quality service for a higher price
and a congestion-tolerant user with a low quality service for a lower
price. Our model allows service providers to better control congestions
while maximizing their profits. 
Keywords: congestion pricing, congestion externalities, market
segmentation, adverse selection
INTRODUCTION
The quality of network services such as Internet access and
video on demand (VOD) services deteriorates as network
utilization increases beyond a certain point. In such situations,
additional (marginal) user causes delay or loss in the service (i.e.,
cost) for the rest of the service users. MacKie-Mason and Varian
(1995a, 1995b) refer this state as a congestion externality. As the
explosive usage growth in network services makes congestion
externality problems very severe, prior research suggests that flat
pricing should be replaced with usage pricing. However, usage
pricing cannot control congestion since it does not reflect
dynamically-changing network utilization. As a result, a user
may get the quality he/she has paid for in low network
utilization but he/she may not get the quality he/she has paid
for in high network utilization. This is not an acceptable
situation for service providers as well as for users (Rho and An
2003). Service providers may lose their money in the long run
because dissatisfied users are not likely to return for their
services. Therefore, service providers must control congestions. 
One way to control congestions is to block new users from
purchasing services when the number of current users is above
certain thresholds (Bohn, et. al. 1993). Although this may be an
effective and easy way to control congestion, it is not likely to
maximize the profits of service providers (MacKie-Mason and
Varian 1995a). Furthermore, it is not very user-friendly because
some users may want to purchase services despite problems in
the service quality. A better way to control congestion problems
is to internalize congestion externalities by charging a higher
unit price as congestion is getting worse (MacKie-Mason and
Varian 1995a, 1995b). This congestion pricing mechanism is
more user-friendly as users can either pay more for the better
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service quality or delay their purchase when congestion occurs. 
Although most congestion pricing mechanisms internalize
congestion externalities, they do not reflect users’ different
congestion sensitivities: some users are congestion-sensitive but
others are congestion-tolerant. To solve this problem, we use
adverse selection to design differentiated menus: a higher price
for a high quality service to a congestion-sensitive user versus a
lower price for a low quality service to a congestion-tolerant user.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a discriminatory
congestion pricing mechanism for a better congestion control as
well as more profits for service providers. In the next section, we
review the prior congestion pricing research. In the following
section, we present a discriminatory congestion pricing
mechanism. We then analytically compare our model with other
pricing models and present a numerical example. Finally, we
discuss implications of our results and directions for future
research.
CONGESTION PRICING RESEARCH
Many researchers in information systems and computer
science have studied the allocation problems to control
congestion in network services. Since early 1990s, economics-
based research has started to investigate network resource
allocation problems (Lin, et. al. 2003). MacKie-Mason and Varian
(1995a) show that a pricing mechanism can solve congestion
externality problems. Since then, many papers have suggested
that congestion pricing models should internalize congestion
externalities by charging a congestion cost as well as a price for
usage.
Varian (1995b) introduces a congestion pricing mechanism
based on auction. Simiu and Srikant (1999) solve congestion
externality problems by applying economic pricing mechanisms
in network. Kelly (2000, 2001) proposes a congestion pricing
mechanism to maximize social welfare. Basar and Srikant (2002)
use a Stackelberg game to show a game-theoretic congestion
pricing mechanism. Recently, Lin, et al. (2003) propose a pricing
model to allocate computing resources such as network
bandwidth and storage quantity so that total benefits of the
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service providers and the service consumers are optimized.
Mathew, et al. (2004) suggest congestion pricing models based
on congestion variations by showing the difference between Web
service providers and application service providers (ASPs). All
these pricing models design the same quality service for the
same price to all users. Therefore, we can name such a pricing
model as a unit congestion pricing model. 
In reality, however, there are different types of users. Some are
congestion-sensitive and the others are congestion-tolerant even
though service providers do not know the information of users’
private demand characteristics, i.e., which user is sensitive.
Gupta et. al. (2000) point out that most congestion pricing
approaches do not consider such a realistic problem. They
address the issue of estimating unknown delay costs based on
users’ choices in order to implement incentive-compatible
network externality pricing. Based on the research of Gupta et al.
(2000), Lin, et al. (2002) also study the issues in implementing
congestion pricing mechanisms. Both studies implement more
realistic congestion pricing mechanisms in network by
considering asymmetric information situation but do not show
how to segment a market for congestion-sensitive users and
congestion-tolerant users. To design differentiated menus for
both types of users, we suggest a game-theoretic discriminatory
congestion pricing mechanism using adverse selection. We
expect that a discriminatory congestion pricing helps service
providers segment their markets and control congestion for
higher profits and a more efficient resource allocation. 
DISCRIMINATORY CONGESTION PRICING MECHANISM
We model our pricing mechanism using an adverse selection
model assuming a monopolistic market with one service provider
and two types of users: congestion-tolerant (type 1) users and
congestion-sensitive (type 2) users. Table 1 summarizes the
notations used in our model.
With notations in Table 1, we assume 
1) qi units of network resource are needed to provide the
80 Seoul Journal of Business
service quality of qi. 
2) C and K are given.
3) θ1 and θ2 are users’ private information. 
Therefore, q1 and q2 measure the qualities that type 1 and type
2 users get, respectively. Since we consider a short-term period,
network utilization can be represented as Y= Q/C (i.e., the degree
of congestion). 
Since the capacity cost is a sunk cost in the short run, we
consider only variable costs. According to MacKie-Mason and
Varian (1995b), most costs of providing additional network
services are more or less independent of the system utilization.
As a result, we can model a service provider’s profit function with
only revenue from users since we can normalize variable cost to
zero as in Varian (2000). Not knowing the congestion sensitivity
of each user, a service provider can maximize its profit as stated
in Salanie (1998).
maxt1,t2,q1,q2 n1t1 + n2t2 (1) 
Most congestion pricing models such as Basar and Srikant
(2002), MacKie-Mason and Varian (1995a), and Simiu and
Srikant (1999) internalize congestion externalities with user’s
utility function consisting of three terms: the utility of usage, the
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Table 1. Notations
Symbol Explanation
n1 and n2 Numbers of type 1 users and type 2 users 
N = n1 + n2 Number of total users
q1 and q2 Quantities necessary to provide a low quality service
and a high quality service, respectively
Total quantity needed to provide services to users
including new users
t1 and t2 Prices of a low quality service and a high quality service,
respectively
K Available system capacity at the time of new users’
service requests
C System capacity in the short run
θ1 and θ2 Congestion sensitivities (preferences) of type 1 users and
type 2 users, respectively, where θ1 ≤ θ2
disutility of loss of quality due to congestion, and the price for
quantities. 
Ui = ui (qi; θi) – νi (qi; qi–1, K) – ti (2)
Following their approach, we assume user ’s utility function as
follows:
(3) 
where qi ≥ 1 and K > n1q1 + n2q2
The first term is the utility of usage which is a strictly concave
function satisfying Spence-Mirrlees condition (u(q; θ2) is
increasing in for all θ2 > θ1). The second term is the disutility
from quality loss which is a strictly convex function as shown in
Simiu and Srikant (1999). The last term is price. For simplicity,
we normalize reservation price to zero. Then, a service provider
lets each user participate in a transaction with the following two
individual rationality (IR) constraints (i.e., participation
constraints).
(4)
At the same time, a service provider has to design an incentive
which makes each user to prefer the menu designed for him/her:
type 1 users choose a low quality service for a lower price while
type 2 users choose a high quality service for a higher price. A
service provider can design such an incentive with the following
two incentive compatibility (IC) constraints. 
(5)
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Following Salanie (1998)’s approach, our model can be
extended from two groups to n groups in sensitivity level with n
incentive compatibility constraints. With (1), (4), and (5), a
service provider designs differentiated menus for type 1 and type




where K > n1q1 + n2q2
In model (6), we can neglect (IC1) and (IR2) since (IR1) andt (IC2) are
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active and q2 ≥ q1 (See Appendix for a proof). Then, we can formulate
a discriminatory congestion pricing as shown in model (7).
Discriminatory congestion pricing model
subject to (7)
t2 = t1 + θ2 (log q2 – log q1)  
where K > n1q1 + n2q2
ANALYSIS
In this section, we analytically compare our pricing model with
unit congestion pricing (unable to segment markets) and
discriminatory usage pricing (unable to control congestion). We
modify our discriminatory congestion pricing into the following
models (8) and (9). (8) is a unit congestion pricing model which
does not consider market segmentation whereas (9) is a
discriminatory usage pricing model which does not consider
congestion control. 
Unit congestion pricing model
subject to (8)
where K > Nq
Discriminatory usage pricing model
subject to t1 = θ1 log q1 (9)
where K > n1q1 + n2q2
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The Necessity of Discriminatory Congestion Pricing Model 
We first show why discriminatory congestion pricing is
necessary using propositions 1 and 2. Proposition 1 compares
total allocated quantities Q*, Q**, and Q*** of model (7), (8), and
(9), showing the necessity of internalizing congestion externalities
(See appendix for proofs).
Proposition 1: Q* ≤ Q** ≤ Q*** = K
Total allocated quantity of model (9) equals to the available
system capacity. That is, a service provider allocates all available
system resources under a discriminatory usage pricing model (9).
When the network capacity is fully utilized, users experience
severe congestions. In this case, users’ disutility proportional to
network utilization may be too significant for service providers to
keep their users satisfied. 
Total allocated quantities of congestion pricing models (7) and
(8) are less than the available system capacity. Service providers
can limit total allocated quantities to a certain threshold,
preventing their users from experiencing severe congestions.
Furthermore, allocated quantity of model (7) is less than or equal
to that of model (8), which implies that the former is better at
controlling congestion than the latter. In conclusion, market
segmentation in addition to congestion pricing could further help
service providers control congestion.
In proposition 2, we compare a discriminatory congestion
pricing model (7) with a unit congestion pricing model (8) in
terms of profits. 
Proposition 2: Π* > Π**
Proposition 2 states that profit of model (7) is greater than that
of model (8). Service providers employing model (7) can make
more profits than that those employing model (8) even though
resources allocated in model (7) are less than or equal to those in
model (8). From propositions 1 and 2, we can infer that market
segmentation help service providers make more profits as well as
better control congestion.
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Analysis of Discriminatory Congestion Pricing Model
Our model (7) designs differentiated menus for type 1 and 2






The equilibrium quantities and prices in model (7) are
determined by the congestion preference and the number of each
type user and total available system capacity. One of the
interesting result is that model (7) allocates the available
resources only to type 2 users when an additional usage makes
the degree of congestion severe 
What this result implies is that our method allows service
providers to block a certain type of users from accessing network
services when the network congestion is severe.
In proposition 4, we compare two differentiated menus in
terms of unit prices. 
Proposition 4: 1) 
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where 
Proposition 4 states that the unit price of a high quality service
may be lower or higher than that of a low quality service
depending on their congestion preferences and network
utilization. If a type 2 user’s utility increment by switching menu
from a type 1’s to his/her own is less than the payment change
(i.e. quantity change times the price for the type 1), he/she does
not have any incentive to choose his/her own menu. In this case,
a service provider has to discount a unit price to induce the type
2 user to select his/her own option (i.e., quantity discount). As a
result, type 2 users get the quantity discount by revealing their
private information when the network utilization level is low.
If a type 2 user’s utility increment is more than the payment
change, he/she has incentive to choose his/her own menu. In
this case, a service provider can charge a premium to the type 2
user (i.e., quantity premium). Type 2 users must pay the
quantity premium for causing more congestion externalities
when the network utilization level is high. 
Our adverse selection model is different from a traditional
adverse selection model (model (9) which does not consider
congestion externalities) in that type 2 users may experience a
penalty (quantity premium) as well as a benefit (quantity
discount) depending on their congestion preferences and network
utilization. Type 2 users in most adverse selection studies get the
quantity discount for revealing private information. However,
type 2 users in this study can pay the quantity premium for
causing more congestion externalities in high network utilization.
NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
In this section, we show the difference between models (7) and
(8) using the following numerical example: C = 100, n1 = n1 = 1,
θ2 = 1.5θ1 = 1.5. Table 2 shows the equilibrium quantities,
prices, total quantities, and profits from models (7) and (8)
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In Table 2, network utilization is measured by the ratio of the
total quantity used and the system capacity, (C – K)/C. For
example, 80% of network utilization implies the available system
capacity at the time of new user’s service request, K, is 20. The
notation ‘-’ represents a situation when a service provider does
not provide the service. 
In this example, model (7) provides each user with a
differentiated menu until the network utilization is 80%.
However, it blocks type 1 users from getting services when the
network utilization is over 80%. On the other hand, model (8)
provides one menu for both type of users until the utilization is
90%. The total quantities allocated in model (7) are less than or
equal to those in model (8). However, model (7) provides a service
provider with higher profits than model (8) does.
Figure 1 shows the unit prices of models (7) and (8) depending
on the network utilization. In model (7), the unit prices generally
increase as the network gets congested. The unit price of type 2
users is less than that of type 1 users until Point B in Figure 1
shown in Proposition 3. What this implies is that until a certain
threshold of congestion, a service provider should provide
quantity discount to type 2 users to induce the usage. When the
network gets congested, the unit price of type 2 users increases
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Table 2. The Equilibrium Quantities, Prices, Total Quantities, and
Profits
Discriminatory Congestion Unit Congestion
Utilization
Pricing Model (7) Pricing Model (8)
q*1 q*2 t*1 t*2 Q* Π* q** t** Q** P**
0% 16.67 50.00 0.98 1.70 66.67 2.68 33.33 1.28 66.67 2.57
10% 15.00 45.00 0.94 1.65 60.00 2.59 30.00 1.24 60.00 2.48
20% 13.33 40.00 0.89 1.60 53.33 2.49 26.67 1.19 53.33 2.37
30% 11.67 35.00 0.83 1.54 46.67 2.37 23.33 1.13 46.67 2.26
40% 10.00 30.00 0.76 1.48 40.00 2.24 20.00 1.06 40.00 2.12
50% 8.33 25.00 0.68 1.40 33.33 2.08 16.67 0.98 33.33 1.97
60% 6.67 20.00 0.59 1.30 26.67 1.89 13.33 0.89 26.67 1.77
70% 5.00 15.00 0.46 1.18 20.00 1.64 10.00 0.76 20.00 1.52
80% 3.33 10.00 0.28 1.00 13.33 1.28 6.67 0.59 13.33 1.17
90% – 5.00 – 0.72 5.00 0.72 3.33 0.28 6.67 0.57
100% – – – – – – – – – –
rapidly. This implies that a service provider should charge
premium to type 2 users to control congestions while maximizing
profits. Unlike the unit price of type 2 users, the unit price of
type 1 users decreases when the network is congested (over Point
A). Point A is a point when type 1 users are no longer willing to
pay more for each unit because the disutility due to congestion
decreases the values of the service. 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has proposed a discriminatory congestion pricing
mechanism for network services using adverse selection in game
theory. Equilibrium quantities and prices in our model are
determined by total available system capacity, the congestion
preferences, and the proportion of each type users. Therefore,
service providers can offer differentiated menus for users with
different congestion sensitivities depending on dynamically-
changing network utilization. 
There are several implications for managers of network
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Figure 1. Unit Prices
services. First, varying prices of network services depending on
network utilization is an effective way of controlling congestions.
Services subject to congestions such as VOD and network
storage services require efficient and effective congestion control
methods. However, most service providers solve congestion
problems by increasing capacity, which is an expensive option.
Our model provides an inexpensive alternative to increasing
capacity.
Second, segmenting markets can not only maximize profits but
also better control congestions. In most cases, market
segmentation is used to increase profits. However, our model
shows that market segmentation in congestion pricing allows
better congestion control. Our model allocates less resources by
blocking low quality service users from getting services and
charging more for high quality service users.
Third, quantity premium as well as quantity discount for high
quality services are necessary depending on network utilization.
High quality service users in most cases get quantity discount for
revealing their private information. However, high quality service
users (i.e., type 2 users) in this study may pay the quantity
premium for causing more congestion externalities in high
network utilization. .
Our research has a few limitations, each of which is a direction
for future research. First, we will extensively compare our model
with other models using various sets of data. We will investigate
the effects of various factors such as utilization, user sensitivity,
proportion of each type users, etc. Second, we will extend our
model in several directions. We will consider n types of users,
because in real world, consumers’ sensitivity levels would be
much more heterogeneous than two levels assumed in this
paper. We can also consider other factors such as administration
cost and initial cost which are assumed to be zero in this paper.
Finally, we will address the implementation issues of congestion
pricing models such as ours. They include how to estimate the
cognitive costs of users and overcome users’ resistance, etc.
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Appendix
Simplifying model (6) into model (7)
① Since θ2 ≥ θ1 and q1 ≥ 0, from(IC2), 
If (IR1), is inactive, i.e., θ1 log q1
then (IR2) is inactive, i.e. θ2 log q2
In this case, if the a service provider raises price from t1 to t2,
then it can increase its profit. 
So, (IR1) is active at the optimum
② Since θ2 ≥ θ1, q1 ≥ 0, and (IR1) is active, if (IC2) is inactive,
then
In this case, if the a service provider raises price t2 subject to
(IC2), then it can increase its profit. 
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As a result, we get t2 = t1 + θ2(log q2 – log q1).
③ Sum (IC1) and (IC2), then 
That is, θ2 log q2 – θ2 log q1 ≥ θ1 log q2 – θ1 log q1 > 0, since θ2 ≥
θ1.
Therefore, θ2 (log q2 – log q1) > 0. 
Consequently, q2 ≥ q1.
④ From ②, t2 – t1 = θ2 (log q2 – log q1)
And from ③, θ2 log q2 – θ2 log q1 ≥ θ1 log q2 – θ1 log q1 > 0.
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So, 
Therefore, we can neglect (IC1). 
From ①, 
So, 
Therefore, we can neglect (IC2).
Proposition 1
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Thus, 
Since 
As a result, 
Since 
Therefore, we get 
Since a service provider should set
From 
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Similarly, from model (8), 





which leads to 
Therefore, we can show 
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That is, Π* ≥ Π**.
Proposition 3
From the proof of proposition 1, we get the optimal quantities
and prices as following: 
where 
Therefore, we get 
where log q*2 – log q*1 > since q*2 > q*1 as shown in ③. 
As a result, we can show t*2 > t*1 .
Proposition 4
From the proof of proposition 3, we can get 
where θ2 2 1 2 1
1
1
(log – log )– ( – )  * * * *
*














2 2 1 2 1
1
1q
q q q q
t
q*
* * * *
*
*(log – log )– ( – ) ,θ
= +{ }[ ]1
1 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 1q q
q t q q q t* *


















* * * *– – ( – )= =
 t t q q2 1 2 2 1
























1* *   
( – ) –





N t t q q1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1
1























96 Seoul Journal of Business
Therefore, 
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